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1 In this ambitious essay, Salvador Giner displays his elegant and suggestive prose, as
well as his magnificent cultural background, keeping the reader captured until the last
page.
2 Giner  defends  that  moral  principles  which rule  over  human societies  have a  social
origin, that is, they arise through historical and social processes. This fact would entail
that sociology must play a key role in the reflection on ethical and moral problems.
However,  an  important  part  of  contemporary  sociology  would  be  victim  of  the
“amorality  fallacy”.  Giner  criticizes  the  pretension  of  building  a  sociology  that  is
neutral in ethical and moral terms and defends sociologists’ social commitment, which
he views as compatible with the scientific requirements of rigor and objectivity. In this
sense, he argues that “the most accomplished [sociology] is, and not by chance, that
which has issued a moral judgment about the human condition and the civilization of
its time” as well as that “human sciences” must be linked to the reflection on what
must be the good society (p.165). 
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3 Having  set  these  general  principles,  the  author  addresses  the  topic  of  the  “social
production of morality” in the framework of current liberal democracies. Giner states
that,  in  our  societies,  morality  is  the  outcome  of  negotiation  and  contractarian
processes.  Moral  norms  which  legitimate  and  proscribe  certain  behaviours  are  the
result of agreements and pacts among corporations,  professional associations,  trade
unions,  and  institutional  or  sectorial  social  movements  which  try  to  impose  their
interests.  Examples  of  this  kind  of  disputes  would  be  the  regulations  on  abortion,
homosexual marriage, euthanasia or minimum wage.
4 According to Giner, despite that the liberal model of social production of morality is
better  than others  in the past,  such as  absolutism,  we should not  be satisfied.  The
current historical process drives us to the destruction of human civilization. At least
three processes move us towards this fate: destruction of the environment, excessive
demographic  growth  and  the  impossibility  of  perpetual  economic  growth.  In  turn,
Giner points out a series of “endemic tergiversations”, as for example the “intrinsic
amorality of capitalism”, which would be behind the aforementioned processes. 
5 Giner’s conclusion, however, is optimistic. The enormous changes occurring worldwide
in the last decades, such as the spread of liberal democracies or the globalization of
civil society, have set the grounds for a universal morality which is already emerging.
6 According to Giner, we are in a period of “moral transition”. While until now morality
was socially produced, today the conditions exist for a “moral production of society”;
for moral principles guiding the production of society and not the opposite.
7 The main content of this universal (republican) morality consists in the Kantian
categorical imperative, the injunction to treat the fellow man as we would like to be
treated, and to recognize him as a human being equal to us in dignity and freedom (p.
392). Although the imperative emerged in a particular historical and social context, it is
also “asocial” in the sense that it is anchored in our nature, that is, human beings have
moral intuitions and we do not need theoretic knowledge to determine if something is
right or wrong.
8 In this way, Giner encourages us to listen to our conscience and to exercise our civic
virtue to make possible “the dream of our civilization: that of making each individual,
without exception, a rationally autonomous and morally sovereign being” (p.373).
9 Despite the fact that, overall, the essay constitutes a very ambitious work which deals
with a multitude of topics and is full of interesting intuitions, from my point of view, it
also contains some weakness that I would like to address now.
10 In a general way, I think the main virtue of the essay also constitutes its weakest spot
and the origin of the problems comes from what, paraphrasing Jon Elster, we could call
its excessive ambitions. In what follows, I will first mention some specific problems and
then express some doubts about the main thesis.
11 The text has a certain number of problems that, despite being relatively serious–in part
because  of  their  recurrence–do  not  greatly  affect  the  main  argument.  Given  the
limitations of space, I will not address all of them here and will limit myself to briefly
discussing three of them which in particular have called my attention, without any
intention of exhaustiveness.
12 First,  Giner  states  (p.28)  that  his  approach  is  fundamentally  methodological
individualistic.  As  is  well  known,  methodological  individualism  is  a  methodological
principle  according  to  which  all  social  phenomena  can  be  reduced  to  individuals,
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individuals’  properties  or  relationships  among  individuals  (see  Jon  Elster,  1982,
“Marxism, functionalism, and game theory”, Theory and Society, 11-4, p.453-482).
13 In the text, however, Giner seems to confuse methodological individualism with ethical
individualism (p.28) and with rational choice theory (p.168-169). In a general way, it is
very dubious that  his  approach is  methodological  individualistic  since he addresses
many macrosocial phenomena without trying to carefully identify the mechanisms that
produce them at the micro level.
14 Secondly, Giner seems to fall into some teleological arguments, which, as is well known,
have  been  very  seriously  questioned  in  the  last  decades  (see  Elster,  art.cit.).  In
Chapter 7, entitled “dysfunctionalities”, for example, Giner states, quoting Durkheim,
that a certain level of crime is necessary for a country to increase the level of social
cohesion  that  reinforces  its  civil  and  criminal  laws  and  later  adds  that  political
corruption  “is  structurally  necessary  for  the  common  good.  Some  amount  of
transgression is functional for the political common good”. Finally, according to the
author,  it  is  for  this  reason  that  corruption  is  endemic  to  democracy  (p.233-234).
Beyond the dubious validity of the argument, it seems to hide a teleological reasoning.
However,  given  that,  like  in  some  other  parts  of  the  text,  the  argument  is  a  bit
ambiguous, it is not totally clear if Giner is suggesting that corruption exists because it
is necessary for democracy. 
15 Thirdly, from my point of view, the discussion on the axiological neutrality of sociology is
not very clear. On the one hand, defending that science must be neutral does not imply
at  all  that  scientists  cannot  have  ethical  or  moral  commitments  or  that  those
commitments  cannot  guide  their  academic  interests.  For  example,  it  is  perfectly
possible that a sociologist worried about educational inequality would decide to study
the mechanisms that produce them in order to be able to propose policies to reduce
them. However, if the sociologist wants to correctly identify the mechanisms at work,
he or she cannot let his/her values, interests, passions or prejudices interfere in the
research process. And, of course, if the sociologist is successful, the outcome of his/her
research could be used by someone who wanted to design policies to reproduce or even
increase inequalities. Thus, his/her research is neutral.
16 On the other hand,  it  is  necessary to  remember that  much (most?)  of  high quality
sociological research does not have clear immediate ethical or moral implications and
that it does not have any relation at all with the reflection on good society. For example,
I cannot see what the implications are in this field of debate about the mechanisms that
cause status hierarchies to emerge in a face-to-face interaction context. In this sense, I
think it is very problematic to state that the most accomplished sociology is that which
has an ethical or moral commitment and even more so to state that this is “not by
chance” (suggesting that there is  some kind of  unspecified causal  link between the
researcher’s ethical and moral motivations and the scientific quality of his/her work). 
17 Beyond  specific  problems,  there  are  some  elements  that  drive  me  to  be  relatively
sceptical about the main theses of the essay, despite the brave manner in which Giner
defends them.
18 First of all, regarding the social production of morality, it is not very clear to me what
exactly is supposed to be socially produced. Throughout most of the book the author
seems to refer to values and informal norms. For example, on p.22 he says that he will
try to explain the “production and validity of values, norms and moral judgments”.
However,  Giner  fails  to  mention  the  debates  on  the  emergence  processes  of  social
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norms or those on the mechanisms for the diffusion of  beliefs  and collective belief
formation. Besides, as I said, in Chapter 6 he argues that public moral is the outcome of
negotiations  among corporations,  professional  associations  and trade unions.  If  the
author  refers  to  the  emergence  and  diffusion  of  values  and  informal  norms,  the
argument not only contravenes all  contemporary social theory on the topics, but is
highly implausible. Obviously, ethical or moral values prevailing in a society emerge
and spread through complex social processes that we do not understand well yet; they
are not decided among organizations and institutions through pacts of interests.
19 However, given the examples that the author offers in this same chapter, it seems that
Giner is not referring here to values and informal norms, but to formal rules (laws,
policies, etc.) that regulate social problems with ethical and moral implications. If that
is the case, then the argument is basically correct, but perhaps somewhat trivial. Of
course, laws and policies are usually the outcome of agreements among organizations
and institutions in liberal democracies. However, Giner is wrong when reducing these
processes  to  negotiations  and he  does  not  take  into  account  the  role  of two other
mechanisms of collective decision making: voting and deliberation (see Jon Elster, 2007,
Explaining social behavior, Cambridge University Press, Chap. 25). In this same sense, the
work would be even more valuable if he dealt with some aspect of the many debates in
this field in detail. 
20 Instead of this, however, Giner tries to tackle a series of large macrosocial processes.
From my point of view, this option is questionable given that those processes are too
broad,  that  is,  Giner  does  not  respect  the  principle  of  methodological  singularism
according to which research should focus on explananda whose temporal and spatial
contours are clearly specified (Raymond Boudon, 2012, “Analytical sociology and the
explanation of beliefs”, Revue européenne des sciences sociales, 50-2, p.7-34). 
21 In general, Giner describes well-known processes, such as the environmental crisis or
the  spread  of  liberal  democracies  in  recent  decades,  but  does  not  make  a  detailed
analysis of the mechanisms that link these processes. Causal relationships are, at most,
postulated. For example, as I said, Giner identifies several “endemic tergiversations”
which “are behind” (p.366) the most serious problems of humanity. It is not clear to me
if  with  the  expression  “are  behind”  the  author  is  claiming  that  there  are  causal
connections between both groups of phenomena. If that is so, he should try to specify
more clearly the concrete mechanisms through which that happens.
22 Furthermore, the main thesis of the essay that the conditions for a “moral production
of society” exist nowadays and that we should listen to our conscience and exercise our
civic virtue to build a society where everybody is rationally autonomous and morally
sovereign, suffers from similar problems. First of all, even if building a new world based
on moral principles could be feasible nowadays, this does not mean that it is really
going  to  built.  Giner  knows that,  but  the  problem is  that  arguing  that  the  way  to
achieve such a world involves following our moral intuitions and exercising civic virtue
seems too vague to me. Giner leaves out the enormous problems of collective decision
making, collective action and a long etcetera which make it  difficult to achieve the
objective. Moreover, the objective itself is not defined precisely enough. In this sense,
proposing that the objective is to make each individual a rationally autonomous and
morally sovereign being again seems too vague to me and not very informative.
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23 In short, in spite of some problems, which are inevitable in a work like this, El origen de
la  moral is  a  major  essay  that  addresses  some  of  the  main  challenges  facing  our
civilization in a brave and ambitious way. 
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